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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in S - 3/13/61

Memorandum of Conversation

DOE, DOS review(s) completed.

DATE: March 2, 1961.

SUBJECT: MEETING OF PRINCIPALS

PARTICIPANTS: See Attached List

COPIES TO:

S/S

G

S/P - Mr. McGhee

S/AE - Mr. Farley

D - Mr. Gullion, Mr. Dean

D - Mr. Spiers (3)

EUR - Mr. Kohler

IO - Mr. Cleveland

Dept. of Def. - Mr. McNamara

✓ CIA - Mr. Dulles

AEC - Mr. Seaborg

W.H. - Dr. Wiesner, Mr. Bundy

Mr. McCloy

Amcongen Geneva NUCDEL - Mr. Whittemore

Secretary Rusk noted that the President had indicated a serious interest in seeing what could be accomplished in getting an agreement in the nuclear test conference. The Principals had the task of putting Mr. Arthur Dean, the U.S. Representative to the Nuclear Test Talks, in a position both to protect American interests and to get agreement with the Soviets if this is possible. Secretary Rusk remarked that it would be important to find points of agreement genuinely satisfactory to both sides since we know there are many areas where this will be impossible. He then commented on the relevance of the nuclear test conference to disarmament, recognizing that while the history of disarmament had not been encouraging, our people and others hoped for the limitation of armaments at lower levels. Many dangerous problems were involved in disarmament; one was the tendency of democracies to disarm at the drop of a hat. Secretary Rusk nevertheless felt it might be in our interest to accept an arms control measure if it could be done at this time. Secretary Rusk then asked Mr. McCloy for his views on the nuclear test conference.

Mr. McCloy remarked that while everything had not been irrevocably decided with respect to seeking agreement in the nuclear test conference, the President had recognized

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that his request for postponement of the opening date of the negotiations implied that the U.S. intended to negotiate in good faith. Mr. McCloy further noted that considerable progress had already been made in the Geneva negotiations and that it would be unwise to strike out in a new direction in the negotiations. Interdepartmental discussions had been held on the issues in the negotiations and four issues which had been unresolved after these discussions should be cleared up at this meeting. After disposing of these issues there could then be a report by Dr. Fisk on the contents of his panel's report. Mr. McCloy noted that the final version had become available only that morning but that then he had felt it necessary to parallel the efforts of the Fisk Panel by proceeding with a review of the U.S. positions in the conference. He had, of course, been aware of how the work of the Fisk Panel was proceeding. Finally, Mr. McCloy reported, considerable progress had been made in coordinating our positions with the British, who had a delegation here under the leadership of David Ormsby-Gore.

Mr. McCloy then turned to the first item on the agenda, namely, the question of Safeguards for the Seismic Research Program. In explanation, Mr. McCloy said that the U.S. would like to detonate certain nuclear devices in its seismic research program, but that the U.S. proposals for proving these shots were not weapons tests had not been accepted by the Soviet Union. After reviewing prior U.S. safeguards proposals, Mr. McCloy proposed that the Principals adopt as a U.S. position the unilateral opening for inspection of devices of obsolete design. Mr. McCloy noted that the agencies had in the past generally accepted the proposal he was making and he suggested that the Principals now adopt this approach and agree on a unified approach to Congress.

Secretary McNamara stated that he concurred in the proposal.

Chairman Seaborg stated that he concurred, but added that legislation was obviously necessary before this proposal could be implemented. AEC support of this proposal was on the understanding that the Administration would be very careful to keep in close touch with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on this question. Chairman Seaborg further remarked that the Administration should separate the weapon connotation from the devices used in the seismic research program. He felt some things might be done to the nuclear devices used so that the device could not be called a weapon but rather a nuclear explosive.

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Secretary Rusk agreed with both points.

Chairman Seaborg observed that it would be desirable for the Joint Committee to be consulted before the Administration's position on safeguards became frozen. Another thought had also occurred to the AEC.

Even if it agreed to the new U.S. safeguards proposal, the Soviet Union might later claim that the U.S. nuclear shots were, in fact, weapons tests. It therefore might be a good idea to have a competent neutral or United Nations representative involved in the safeguarding operation so that this individual could certify the nuclear shot was not a weapon test.

Mr. McCloy said that he was worried about the proposal to involve a neutral since this might increase our difficulties with respect to the Nth country problem. He felt it might be considered strange that we could not show a nuclear device to the French, for example, but that we could show this to a neutral representative. Furthermore, the idea of declassifying the design of nuclear devices to be used in the research program had been repudiated because, among other things, it would involve showing the design to non-nuclear powers.

Secretary Rusk remarked that the Soviet Union had its own concept of which nations were neutrals; for example, the Soviets might not think of Switzerland or Sweden as neutral. He then asked whether Mr. McCloy would give some thought to this suggestion by Chairman Seaborg.

Mr. McCloy agreed that he would, but he thought this question of neutral or UN certification was a bridge we might cross when we come to it. Possibly if the U.K. said that the device was not a weapon, the Soviets would not have a very strong argument.

Dr. Wiesner said that since the nuclear devices in question were clearly obsolete, he failed to see how the question of weapons testing would arise. Chairman Seaborg replied that some of the devices to be used in the research program had not been exploded in the particular yields which were specified for the program; this might raise some question as to whether these devices were new weapons.

Mr. Allen Dulles stated that CIA had no objection to the proposal concerning disclosure of nuclear devices to be used since the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons

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which were much more sophisticated than the devices it was proposed to show the Soviets.

Dr. Wiesner remarked that the Soviet Union may object to the decoupling shots proposed for the research program on grounds that these shots would teach us how to evade the test ban agreement. There was some validity in this since a country which had not tried out decoupling would have to proceed very slowly and cautiously if it tried to evade the agreement in this manner. While he concurred in the proposal for unilateral disclosure, Dr. Wiesner wished to note that the decoupling shots were a weakness in the U.S. position. Chairman Seaborg noted that the decoupling shots were also for the purpose of learning whether these shots could be detected.

Secretary Rusk noted that the proposal for safeguarding a seismic research program could be taken as agreed and suggested that Mr. McCloy describe the next item on the agenda.

Mr. McCloy then turned to the question of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives. He proposed that the U.S. agree to give the Soviet Union the right to look at any devices which we use in our Plowshare program. This of course would mean that we would have to use obsolete devices unless we were willing to open more advanced devices to Soviet scrutiny. We would resist the idea of giving the Soviet Union blueprints, but we would give the Soviets a chance to look at the devices. Mr. McCloy said he understood that a MARK 11 device could be used for some aspects of Plowshare but that this was not the device which the AEC would like to use. This proposal would limit the development of the Plowshare program and therefore the AEC would prefer to retain the "black box" concept of safeguards for this program.

Secretary Rusk inquired how much interest the Soviet Union had shown in the negotiations in the use of nuclear explosives for peaceful uses. Mr. Stelle and Mr. Spiers replied that the Soviet Union had shown no interest at all beyond tabling a treaty article on peaceful uses to counter an article which the U.S. had submitted. The Soviets considered that their acceptance in principle of peaceful uses detonation was a concession to the West.

Secretary Rusk then turned to the other Principals for their views.

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Secretary McNamara stated that he concurred in Mr. McCloy's proposal.

Chairman Seaborg stated that he would also accept Mr. McCloy's proposal but he believes that an upper limit on the number of shots in the program during an agreed time period, as proposed by the State Department, was not necessary. Dr. Wiesner remarked that there might be a radiation problem for which reason a ceiling on the number of shots would be useful.

Mr. McCloy agreed that ^{the}U.S. need not propose initially an upper limit on the number of shots but should rather wait until we hear from the Soviet Union on our revised proposal.

Mr. Dulles said that he had no objection to the proposal.

Mr. Bundy inquired whether Plowshare was a sensitive issue with the Joint Committee. Chairman Seaborg replied that it was but that the more important question for the Joint Committee was that of opening of nuclear devices to inspection. Mr. McCloy concluded discussion of this item by expressing his feeling that the AEC had made a considerable concession in the interest of achieving an agreement in Geneva.

Mr. McCloy then turned to the next item on the agenda: the question of Numbers of On-Site Inspections. Mr. McCloy reviewed the history of the negotiations on the number of on-site inspections and stated that he now wished to propose that the Principals adopt a position calling for 10 on-site inspections annually in the territories of each of the original parties with an additional on-site inspection to be added to the quota for each 5 eligible seismic events beyond 50 and with a ceiling of on-site inspections to be set at 20 for each original party. Mr. McCloy felt that this proposal would mean no significant change in the U.S. position if estimates of the number of seismic events in the U.S.S.R. were correct. Mr. McCloy stated that the scientists had not been able to tell him that any one specific number was the correct number of on-site inspections; while 20 on-site inspections had considerable merit, there was no magic in that number. The Soviet Union was able to argue that our quota number was just as political a figure as the Soviet proposal of 3. Furthermore, the U.K. had in a sense pulled the rug out from under us since Prime Minister Macmillan had told Khrushchev that a number of

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on-site inspections (which we thought to be something like eight) would be an acceptable quota. Mr. Ormsby-Gore had been very appreciative of the escalator proposal and felt that he could sell it to the U.K. government. Mr. McCloy felt that it was important that the position with which we returned to Geneva reflect a fully agreed Western position. The difficulty was that the number of 20 was looked on by some Congressional leaders as essential. Mr. McCloy concluded by recommending that the Principals adopt the escalator proposal with a ceiling of 20 and a floor of 10 and remarked that he felt that the security of the country would not be impaired by a quota number of something less than 20.

Mr. Arthur Dean stated that there had been two days of very constructive talks with the U. K. and complete agreement had been achieved on the positions which Mr. McCloy was now presenting to the Principals. Mr. Dean felt that if the Soviet Union sensed any disunity between the U.S. and the U.K. on the quota question, the Soviet Delegation would hammer at this point with the result that the importance of the other moves we were making would be downgraded. Mr. Dean believed that under the escalator proposal we would generally get the number of inspections which we wanted in any case. As to the ceiling of 20, this was a political fact of life unless we sought to repudiate a number which we had already tabled. Secretary Rusk commented that the key point on this proposal in his judgment was whether the Administration could take the treaty to the country in the sincere conviction that the control system agreed upon was genuine and not a sham. He then asked the other Principals for their views.

Secretary McNamara stated that he preferred to hear the views of others before commenting.

Mr. McCloy said he felt the proposal he was making constituted a substantial deterrent to Soviet violation. He further stated that it was his understanding that Dr. Kistiakowsky, after consideration of scientific factors involved, had concluded that 10 on-site inspections in the Soviet Union would be an acceptable deterrent.

Dr. Wiesner pointed out that there would be an intelligence contribution which would help us on this problem and that we would also have unilateral capabilities for distinguishing between natural events and explosions. Dr. Wiesner believed that one clandestine nuclear test would not be significant in changing U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear weapon

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capabilities. With something like 20% sampling, it was unlikely that a series of tests could go undetected. Dr. Fisk remarked that his committee had examined the question of how many unidentified events would occur in the Soviet Union and had concluded that there would be something like 70 to 75 unidentified events greater than 20 KT yield in the Soviet Union annually. This assumed control posts only in the 3 original parties and assumed no decoupling. This number would be cut in half if the entire world-wide Geneva system were installed.

Chairman Seaborg felt that the question of the number of on-site inspections was the most important part of the whole treaty. It was the most important safeguard we had against Soviet violation. In this connection, he shared the concern expressed by Secretary Rusk about the support of the American people for the treaty. Chairman Seaborg also understood that there was a scientific basis for the U.S. proposal on number of on-site inspections. Utilizing certain analytical techniques, the number of really unidentified events in the U.S.S.R. could be reduced to about 20. If the escalator proposal were to be put forward, Chairman Seaborg believed the upper limit of 20 inspections should be deleted.

Mr. Bundy inquired whether Chairman Seaborg's comment concerning 20 suspicious events meant that there would be a one-for-one inspection of the really suspicious events with our present proposal for 20 inspections in the Soviet Union. Chairman Seaborg agreed that this was so and felt that because of this the treaty could be acceptable to the American people. Mr. Stelle remarked that the U.S. had already, in fact, suggested this proposal in Geneva when we had proposed that 20% of all located events be inspected. The difference was that we had not suggested a floor of 10 inspections. The Soviet Union had already rejected this proposal.

Dr. Wiesner said that he personally would like to hold to the flat number of 20 on-site inspections if the UK would go along with us. Secretary Rusk inquired whether the Soviet Union had provided us with any data as to the number of unidentified seismic events. Dr. Wiesner and Mr. Keeny said that the Soviet experts had agreed with seismicity figures which we had given them. Secretary Rusk commented that he had thought the escalator proposal would result in about 20 on-site inspections being carried out in the Soviet Union annually.

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Secretary McNamara said that because of the fact that in some years there were many more than 100 seismic events in the Soviet Union, he felt it would be desirable to have a cumulative upper limit. In this way, we could take care of the years in which the numbers of earthquakes greatly exceeded the number of 100 by accumulating on-site inspections which we might not wish to use in the low seismicity years.

Dr. Wiesner stated that he had talked with Mr. Ormsby-Gore and had told him of his belief that the U.S. should stick with the 20 on-site inspections; he had also been told by certain Soviet scientists that if everything else were agreed in the treaty there might be no problem with 20 on-site inspections in the Soviet Union. He was somewhat surprised, therefore, that Mr. McCloy and Mr. Dean had received different impressions from the British.

Mr. Dulles said he would not comment on this proposal except to say that he felt his agency could be of some help in the problem of deciding which events to inspect. This would depend on the amount of work involved in an attempt at clandestine testing. For example, if large amounts of earth movement were necessary for a decoupling shot, intelligence might be able to pick up this activity.

Secretary Rusk concluded that the question of numbers of on-site inspection was such a sensitive one that, regardless of whether agreement could be reached among the Principals, it should be discussed with the President. This was generally agreed.

Secretary McNamara added that the Principals should speak to the range in frequency of seismic events so that the whole picture could be seen. Dr. Wiesner remarked that he felt the method of sampling seismic events was a tremendous deterrent and that a one-for-one inspection of seismic events was not necessary.

Mr. McCloy then turned to the last item on the agenda: High Altitude. He remarked that in 1959 a committee of U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. experts had set up a theoretical control system for monitoring outer space. Mr. McCloy proposed that the Principals adopt a proposal for a full ban on weapons tests at high altitudes and in outer space and install the experts' control system to monitor this environment. This system would be installed in phases, and components could be changed by agreement among the original parties. He felt that joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation

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in putting in a control system for monitoring outer space could be a way of advancing our common knowledge. Mr. McCloy said he had concluded that we would not be losing very much by agreeing to a ban on weapons tests in outer space.

Secretary McNamara said he was not clear as to what kind of research program would be carried out in connection with the outer space monitoring system. Mr. McCloy replied that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. would cooperate in putting up a satellite system and establishing ground equipment; the data derived from this and from our own research would be made available to the U.S.S.R. We would expect to obtain similar data from the U.S.S.R. Dr. Wiesner remarked that a research program for outer space monitoring would not involve nuclear detonations. Mr. Nitze inquired whether it was not true that the Soviet Union could evade a test ban agreement in outer space. In this connection Dr. Fisk noted that the capabilities talked about in the control system proposed by the experts was detection out to a distance on the order of 1 million kilometers for unshielded detonations. Mr. McCloy added that he understood that it would require about a year to get a nuclear device out to this distance for a test. Secretary McNamara then stated that he would concur in Mr. McCloy's proposal.

Secretary Rusk inquired as to the feasibility of the control system suggested by the experts. Dr. Fisk replied that it was within the state of the art but that the components required did not exist at the present time. There was no further objection by the other Principals to Mr. McCloy's proposal.

Secretary McNamara then stated that he would like to raise two questions which he thought the Principals ought to discuss. The first was how we could disengage from the Treaty in the event of certain actions by other countries. The second was how we could disengage from the present moratorium on tests. Mr. Spiers replied that in the case of the first question there was a duration clause in the treaty which provided that the U.S. could withdraw from the Treaty in case it was not being fulfilled. Of relevance, also, was a phasing provision which required installation of control posts on a world-wide basis on a specified schedule. On the second question, Mr. McCloy believed that the President did not wish to set a date for discontinuing the moratorium but that he did contemplate a resumption of tests if it became apparent that the Soviets were stalling on reaching an agreement. Secretary Rusk stated that it was the position

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of the Department of State that the moratorium should not be continued indefinitely if agreement were not reached. Secretary McNamara said that he strongly felt the moratorium should not be extended indefinitely and he wondered whether it were possible to plan in advance on how the moratorium could be broken off in the event of failure to agree on a treaty. Dr. Wiesner felt that such a plan in existence at this time would torpedo the conference. Mr. Dean remarked that as far as a plan for presenting the revised Western position was concerned, he anticipated about two weeks of detailed presentation at the end of which time the new Western position would be fully exposed to the Soviet Union.

Secretary Rusk inquired how much of a lag there would be between the signal to go ahead with preparation for nuclear shots and the time of detonation. Chairman Seaborg and Gen. Betts replied that tunnels were ready and that approximately 3 to 6 months would be required for installing instrumentation and making final preparations. Secretary Rusk then stated that it seemed to him there was great merit in standing on statements which the President had previously made on this question of the relation between the effort toward agreement and the resumption of tests. He felt that how we handled a break in the moratorium would depend on developments in the conference since disputes over specific issues would have to be handled in different ways.

Mr. McCloy said that it would be very difficult to work out a plan now that would be worthwhile. Further developments in the conference would be of great importance in determining what we do. He had, however, given thought to this matter and had certain ideas as to what should be done.

Secretary McNamara then said he would pose the question in a different way: would we in fact resume tests if agreement in Geneva were not possible?

Mr. Bundy said that in any event, this would be a poor time to make the decision. Secretary Rusk said he had supposed the U.S. would resume tests if agreement in Geneva could not be reached. Mr. Bundy said that he felt Secretary Rusk's suggestion of staying within previous statements by the President on this question was wise and should be followed by the Administration. Secretary Rusk asked that a paper be drawn up compiling the statements by the President on this question.

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Secretary McNamara inquired what we expected from France in connection with this treaty. Secretary Rusk replied that there was a phasing provision in the treaty which called for world-wide installation of a control system and that this envisaged nearly universal adherence to the treaty. Mr. Spiers stated that the objective had always been to obtain a world-wide system, to be installed in phases. It had been felt that by making common cause with other nuclear powers, we could put pressure on other countries to join the treaty. Otherwise there was little we could do so stop Nth countries. Secretary McNamara then inquired whether France could test for four years if its presence as a member of the treaty was not required until Phase II. Mr. Stelle replied that under U.S. proposals, the Control Commission could invite France to join the treaty at any time; if the French refused to join, the duration clause of the treaty could be invoked. While this problem pertained to France, it also pertained much more importantly to China. Secretary Rusk asked that Mr. McCloy draw up a paper specifying the conditions under which the U.S. could withdraw from the treaty.

Referring to certain other issues in connection with the nuclear test conference, Chairman Seaborg commented that there should be a tightening up of the provisions pertaining to participation of "other side" nationals in special flights and on-site inspections teams. He felt that at least one-half of the personnel on such special flights and inspection teams operating in U.S.S.R. territory should consist of U.S.-U.K. nationals, rather than leaving this open as had been suggested. Chairman Seaborg also questioned whether the U.S. representative in the Control Commission should be given authority to change the treaty obligation as regards phasing of the control system and installation of components within phases. Furthermore, he felt it would be dangerous for the U.S. delegation to attempt to determine whether the Soviets were interested in combining other arms control measures with the nuclear test ban agreement, as had also been suggested. Secretary Rusk replied that the staff would work on these problems in connection with further preparation by the Department of State of instructions for the U.S. delegation. As far as the authority of the U.S. representative on the Control Commission was concerned, that person would act in accordance with the wishes of the U.S. Government and subject to Constitutional processes. Mr. Dean remarked that on the question of Soviet interest in other arms control measures in connection with the test ban agreement, it was envisaged

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that negotiations with/^{the}Soviet Union might still go on even if the U.S. broke off the moratorium. This, therefore, would not prolong the moratorium.

Secretary Rusk then asked Dr. Fisk to summarize the report of his committee. Dr. Fisk said that the report had been agreed to except for the last chapter which concerned the difficult question of what could be said of the effect of a test cessation on our military posture. This last chapter had been drafted to indicate that there was a spectrum of opinion on certain matters. Gen. Loper had not agreed to the last chapter and would submit a separate comment. Dr. Fisk then briefly reviewed the report, pointing out that there were varying views within his committee as regards the importance of very light weight strategic weapons and the importance of seeking further improvements in the technology of tactical nuclear weapons.

Gen. Loper stated that he wished it known that he had dissented from the last chapter of the report because he felt that it had not dealt with the problem of cost effectiveness, a matter which could be handled and which was of great importance to the national economy. Secretary Rusk expressed his appreciation to Dr. Fisk for the work he and his committee had done.

Mr. Bundy then inquired as to the timing of further actions in connection with the nuclear test conference. He remarked that he understood there was a certain urgency attached to seeing Congressional leaders and he inquired whether the Fisk Report should be made available to Congress.

Mr. McCloy replied that he had not addressed himself as yet to the problem as to what dissemination to make to the Fisk Report. Chairman Seaborg remarked that it did not seem to him that we could look for favorable legislative action if Congress could not review the Fisk Report.

After some discussion, the Principals agreed that the President should be consulted as soon as possible in regard to further action to be taken in preparing for the resumption of the nuclear test talks, and particularly on the unresolved question of numbers of on-site inspections.

The meeting adjourned at 6:40 p.m.

Attmt: List of Participants.

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Attachment

MEETING OF PRINCIPALS

March 2 - 4:30 p.m. - Under Secretary's Conference Room

STATE

Secretary Rusk
Mr. Bowles
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Gullion
Mr. Spiers
Mr. Baker
Mr. Goodby (reporting)

WHITE HOUSE

Mr. McCloy
Mr. Fisher
Dr. Wiesner
Mr. Keeny
Mr. Bundy
Dr. Fisk

DEFENSE

Secretary McNamara
Mr. Nitze
General Lemnitzer
General Loper
General Dabney
Mr. Lanier
Admiral Dudley

AEC

Chairman Seaborg
General Betts
Dr. English
Dr. Walske
General Luedecke
Mr. Howard Brown

CIA

Mr. Dulles
Dr. Scoville

US DEL

Amb. Dean
Min. Stelle

S/S

Mr. Grant

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles:

After you have noted, I will send this on
to Pete Scoville for his information. *Pete*

has a copy -
for



[Signature]
AAB
16 Mar 61
(DATE)

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